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1. Introduction
How to present local currencies in European history?
The subject is rather complex, as the first point is a clear definition of what
might be called “local currencies”. In some respects, currencies inside a given territory
are local currencies, thus including currencies from nation states and even transnational
but still territorial currencies as the euro. This leads to define “monetary localism”, i.e.
local currency schemes, as the organization of a location of exchanges within a specific
space by way of an adaptation of an existing monetary system or the construction of a
proper monetary system (Blanc, 2002). In this respect, today’s monetary system is built
around local currencies, whose territories are the nation-states’ ones. This is obviously
not the purpose of this conference to develop an historical insight on these currencies; it
is rather to wonder about local currencies on a sub-state level. Nevertheless, an
historical account of local currencies may hardly pass over state local currencies, at
least because there were times, not so ancient, when modern nation states were built and
had to expel other local currencies, that were from then considered as currencies
competing against sovereignty. Nation-state currencies may be considered, then, as a
form of local currencies that triumphed over other forms.
In the following section, I will present the analytical framework through which
European history of local currencies will be viewed. Section three deals with cases of
local currencies issued as answers to situations of necessity, section four deals with
local currencies issued from banks, and section five deals with local currencies mainly
issued by civil organisations and aiming to change the nature of money and, beyond, the
economic  organization  of  society.  Section  six  concludes  and  tries  to  establish
differences between local currencies from today and those from the past.
                                                
* Laboratoire d’économie de la firme et des institutions (ex Centre Auguste et Léon Walras), Institut des
sciences de l’homme, 14 avenue Berthelot, 69363 Lyon cedex 07 (France). Tél : 04 72 72 64 07, fax : 04
72 72 65 55. E-mail : Jerome.Blanc@univ-lyon2.fr2
2. A framework
2.1. Three historical periods
In order to discuss local currencies in European history, it is to be defined how
broad will be this historical insight. This paper’s choice is to take a broad view, starting
with the end of medieval times and ending with the 1970s. Three main reasons justify
this choice. Firstly, this allows avoiding losing one’s in details, presenting only a couple
of experiences and forgetting to contextualize them. Secondly, experiences of local
currencies where not important since the beginning of the 19
th century and their nature
changed. Finally, this leads to present an analytical framework that should be useful in
order to understand today’s local currencies movement.
One can distinguish, at first, three historical periods.
The first one starts with the end of medieval times, when some kingdoms tended
to unify the monetary systems and coinage; this period was characterized by a great
diversity of money, including forms of local currencies.
The  second  period  corresponds  with  the  building  of  nation  states  and,
consequently, what Benjamin Cohen (1998) calls a “westphalian model of geography of
money”. It is centred on the principle of one nation, one money, clearing each sovereign
territory  of  other  currencies  than  the  sovereign  one,  and  tending  towards  an
international monetary system, that is a system built around contacts between national
currencies. The achievement of such period is rather recent: in Europe, it was done
generally during the 19
th century, sometimes during the first quarter of the 20
th century,
as we will see later with the establishment of issuing monopolies. The first step was the
establishment of a sole unit of account in the whole sovereign territory; the next one,
which was sometimes very long, was the unification of the means of payments, at first
coins and then notes. Some countries still have today a series of banks of issue, as
United Kingdom (in Ulster and Scotland), but their system is regulated by a central
bank.
The third period is characterized by well-established and unified nation-states
monetary systems, however sometimes facing contestations of such a regime of
monetary sovereignty; I assume in this presentation that this period started to change its
nature with the seventies, when contestation became more and more acute. This new
contestation  takes  the  form  of  local  currencies,  as  well  as  informal  and  partial
dollarization, electronic money, debates on monetary unifications (in Europe, with the
implementation of the euro, as well as in Latin America with debates on a full
dollarization), etc. (Cohen, 1998; Blanc, 2000; Helleiner, 2003).
This makes the 30 last years look like a new period in which we are now living.
In this respect, one can consider the fifties and sixties as years of the climax of the3
Westphalia model of monetary sovereignty. It spread all around the world by means of
establishing new territorial currencies in decolonized countries (mainly except from the
Franc zone) and putting each country under the rules of the IMF — or, at least,
presenting its rules as the normal horizon for every country. Helleiner (2003) calls this
period the “final wave”. On an institutional point of view, the achievement of such a
monetary regime was the establishment of Central banking gathering powers among
which was the monopoly right of issue: the number of independent countries having
their central bank rose from 59 in 1950 to 161 in 1990 (Capie, 1995).
2.2. Issuers and rationales for monetary localism
European history gives obvious evidences that the contemporary dynamics of
local currencies is not a new one, but the distinction made above between three
historical periods helps to identify how much the contemporary dynamics is a specific
one. In order to make it clearer, we will operate two useful distinctions.
A  first  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  the  natures  of  issuers  of  local
currencies. One can distinguish indeed four main kinds of organizations issuing local
currencies: public authorities, groups of citizens, businesses.
•  Public authorities take different forms but all administrate a territory with a
political purpose: cities, departments, regions, federated states, provinces, etc.
This  is  the  common  view  on  local  currencies:  everyone  being  used  to
associate money with the State, local currencies are mainly viewed as a sort of
a decentralized mean to issue and manage the currency.
•  Citizens  may  issue  money  through  organizations  centred  on  a  local
territory. As we will see below, some organizations may take a religious
purpose (chapters in late medieval France), or civic purposes sometimes
articulated to political views (Owenian experiments during the 19
th century
and Gesellian experiments during the 20
th century).
•  Businesses may themselves issue money, ranging from local shops issuing
emergency coins, to firms organizing an internal monetary scheme for their
customers (barter trade industry)…
•  Banks are a specific kind of businesses, since their specialized function is
to manage their customer’s accounts and to afford credits. Their credits may
be done under the form of a specific currency.
A second useful distinction is to be made between rationales for establishing
local currencies: sovereignty, seigniorage on issued currency, direct financing through
the issue of circulating bonds, protecting local spaces by avoiding outflows of revenue
or by maintaining them outside deflation or inflation (thus avoiding shortage or4
overflow of currency); revitalizing local exchanges, production and then revenues;
transforming the nature of exchange through a specific currency (Blanc, 2002).
A minimal characterization of rationales for issuing money from the three above
categories can be as follow: while local public administration’s goals are mainly to
protect or stimulate local economies or to finance themselves (when it is not a case of
claiming sovereignty), groups of citizens either aim at stopping a currency shortage or
at transforming the nature of exchanges according to an ideological basis, whereas
businesses aim at organizing exchanges and purchases on the basis of which they can
develop their activity.
This framework is used below in order to identify the main features of the past’s
European monetary localisms and to stress differences between these features and
today’s monetary localism.
3. Local currencies as a result of necessities
Before,  and  during,  the  building  of  the  Westphalian  model  of  monetary
sovereignty, most of local currencies were issued by local public authorities, because of
the pursuing of ancient authorities centred on feudalities, or because of contesting rising
central  powers.  The  Westphalian  trend  towards  monetary  unification  implied  a
progressive simplification of the currency inside sovereign states. However, it is to be
stressed that suppressing local issuers did not mean systematically suppressing their
coins, and the maintained circulation of old coins from disappeared authorities was
frequent. Away from being the direct sign of a distrust of new authorities, their
circulation may be seen as the weight of old routines in a context of a need for such
means of payments. During the second and third historical periods distinguished above,
the disintegration of multinational empires like the Austrian or the Ottoman ones and of
colonial empires outside Europe like the English, the French, the Spanish and the
Portuguese ones led the new independent countries to implement their sovereignty on a
monetary level through the establishment of a proper money.
Aside those pure sovereignty cases, different organisations, including local
public authorities or parapublic organisations, banks, companies, small enterprises and
many kinds of not-for-profit associations, used to resort to special currency issues in
order to fight against a perceived necessity.
Local public authorities, on a sub-state level, had to resort to local currency
issues in emergency cases. In a narrow sense, emergency cases take the form of “siege
money”: war situations in which a besieged town has to issue a substitute to normal
currency in order to prevent a collapse of the internal economic system. European
history is full of this sort of emergency currencies. More interesting, because they are
farer from extreme political disturbance, are emergencies coming from an economic5
disorder. This one may take two opposite forms: deflation (this was the American case
in the beginning of the 1930s and the Argentinean case leading to the country’s collapse
of 2001-02) and hyperinflation (this was the German case of 1922-23 as well as other
countries following the first and the second world war, like Russia, Hungary, etc.). A
third form, sometimes autonomous from deflation and hyperinflation, is a direct
shortage of money, due to formal or informal withdrawal of metals composing the coin
(French case from 1914 to 1924).
Hence, necessities of protecting local economies lead to local currency issues.
Related rationales are the idea of revitalizing activity and financing local projects or
local public authorities. Anyway, necessity situations lead a series of organisations to
implement their own means of payment.
Let us take the very interesting example of the French méreaux, before the
advent of Westphalian model (Labrot et Henckes 1989, later quoted by Blanc 1994 and
Lietaer 2006). The méreaux were pieces of lead or copper that served mainly as receipt
of payments, tokens or other non-monetary uses. Some of them were issued by religious
chapters. They had an internal circulation and, sometimes, an external one. In principle,
their use was only internal. Chapters issued those tokens in order to pay for monks
attending prayers. They were also given for charity to the poor. They were then useable
inside the community, allowing holders to get food, drinks or clothing. Sometimes,
chapters paid for persons offering their services for wine production or building repairs;
those tokens were then useable inside the chapter but also, for example, in taverns
whose  wine  came  from  the  chapter.  Those  limited  uses  lasted  until  the  French
Revolution. An extended external circulation sometimes developed, in situations of
currency shortages. Méreaux issued by a canon community could then circulate all
around the township like other coins, with a semi-official tender anchored in local
habits. This external circulation contravened law but usefully completed the circulation
during shortage periods in some places. Moreover, some towns issued themselves such
méreaux in order to complete a deficient monetary circulation: this was the case in
Mâcon, Arras, Béthune, Autun, Metz, etc., with an internal use at first and then
sometimes an external one. Although the progressive monetary unification of the
kingdom reduced such experiences, some of them occurred late, as Amiens towns’
tokens around 1660, Luçon chapter’s tokens in 1772, etc.
Another French case is the multiple local currencies of 1914-1924. Species
quickly vanished from circulation after the beginning of the war, because of security
hoarding behaviours (on species and banknotes) and the sharp rise in the price of
metals. This led to multiple emergency issues. Local Chambers of commerce (chambres
de commerce) operated an official emergency issue under a ministerial rule of August
1914. Emergency notes and coins from Chambers of commerce lasted until 1924.
Around 140 Chambers of commerce issued, on a local level, notes and coins, whose6
circulation was limited to the issuing area only. Aside those local emergency notes and
coins, coins were issued on a national level and without local identification by the
Chambers of commerce. Moreover, 13 Savings banks (the popular network of the
Caisses d’Epargne) issued local emergency currencies; so did a series of departments,
towns and civil associations.
European history shows many local currencies issued from such situations of
macroeconomic  necessity,  by  public  authorities,  firms  or  banks,  or  even  civil
associations. The necessity to overcome the shortage of money may be related with a
need for funding, that lead organisations to develop their own issues - although the
common reaction to a lack of funding is to limit projects! This was recently the case of
a  dozen  Argentinean  provinces,  between  2001  and  2003  (although  a  couple  of
provinces had issued their first local notes already in the middle of the 1980s).
4. Local currencies issued by banks
The development of banks issuing banknotes, partly (sometimes totally) covered
by metallic reserves and repayable in species, led to provide local economies with
money according to the needs of borrowers and customers of the banks.
If the first banks issuing banknotes in Europe started centuries ago, the general
rise of this practice starts with the seventeenth and more surely the eighteenth century
(the  main  examples  being  the  Bank  of  Amsterdam,  the  Bank  of  Hamburg,  the
Londonian goldsmiths, the Swedish Palmstruch Bank, the Bank of England, etc.).
Banknotes were issued as certificates representing a metallic deposit or as credit
instruments. As such, this was an innovative way of creating money. This rose debates
on the nature of the banknote (was it credit? was it money?) and on the need to regulate
the issues (was it necessary to enforce a complete covering of issues by metallic
reserves? was it necessary to centralize issues, to homogenize notes?). A major debate
during the beginning of the eighteenth century took place between so-called “currency
school” and “banking school”, but there was a third player that argued for freedom, the
“free banking school”. The currency school, supported by David Ricardo, argued for
the control over issues of what was thus considered as money and not credit, by
covering them (up to 100%) by metallic reserves. This position had to fight against free
banking (that took place in Scotland from 1800 to 1845) and against the banking
principle according to which banks should be let free to issue banknotes, as the Law of
Reflux was enough to enforce each issuer’s liquidity. The triumph of the currency
principle led to build monetary systems where banknotes issue had to be controlled in a
hierarchized system in order to implement the rule of the complete metallic covering of
issues. In this system, there where a superior bank that finally got the monopoly over
issue. This orientation had an obvious political dimension, because it permitted to7
finalize  monetary  unifications  into  national  monetary  systems,  where  a  central
institution gathered powers of control and issue: the Central bank.
Then, banknotes unification took place by the establishing of a bank of issue to
which the issuing monopoly was afforded. However, it was not simple at all. In some
countries, this was done very quickly, at the time, the bank of issue was settled: for
example, 1814 in the Low Countries and 1816 in Norway. In others, it took decades,
and the national bank of issue had to cope with other issuing banks, generally issuing
their banknotes on a local level only. Unification was achieved in 1910 only in
Switzerland, but began in 1881 with the homogenization of banknotes, yet issued by
competing banks. The Banque nationale Suisse was created in 1907 and got the
monopoly over banknotes issues in 1910. In Italia, the process was achieved in 1926
with the monopoly to the Banca d’Italia, 63 years after the formal monetary unification
of the country and 33 years after its creation (Kindleberger, 1990; Plessis, 2003).
Let us have a look to British, German and French cases.
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England competed with lower-level banks
of issue, mainly on a local level, during the 19
th century. In 1844, the Peel Act
prevented any new creation of bank of issue, but let the possibility for the 304 existing
banks of issue to go on issuing; they were still 166 in 1881. Even if at that time the
Bank of England had a “quasi-monopoly”, many local banknotes went on circulating.
We may stress the point that most of those banknotes circulated in a small area only,
whereas Bank of England’s banknotes circulated everywhere in the country. This is still
the case today, since Scottish and north-Irish banknotes mainly circulate respectively in
Scotland and Ulster (even if they can be used everywhere in the country) whereas Bank
of England’s banknotes circulate everywhere.
Before the political unification of Germany, the attempts to unify the currency
never went very far. In 1837, with the Munich Coin Treaty and, one year later, the
Dresden Coinage Convention, such a process started with the polarization in two
monetary regions, each one organized around a unit of account – the gulden for the
north, the thaler for the south – but still containing a great variety of means of
payments. In 1857, the trend towards unification was deepened with rules standardizing
coinage (although, not unifying it) (Bordo and Jonung, 2003). Coinage was definitively
unified in 1871 and 1873, following the political unification, on the basis on the mark, a
new and common unit of account replacing all others. Nevertheless, the diversity of
banknotes went on, issued by State banks as well as private banks. The Reichsbank was
created in 1875 in order to be the national bank of issue. But, at that time, 32 other
banks, the Zettelbanken, were authorized to go on issuing banknotes locally. Private
banks had the choice between going on issuing banknotes valid in their region only, and
stopping their issue function in order to be able to develop activities outside their state.
State banks issues were controlled. It took decades to achieve the formal monetary8
unification of 1871. In 1910, 4 banks still had the power to issue banknotes along with
the Reichsbank (in Bade, Bavaria, Saxe and Wurtemberg) – it is noticeable, however,
that the circulation of their banknotes was very little compared with the Reichsbank’s
one (Kindleberger, 1990; Helleiner, 2003; Plessis, 2003).
French banknote unification took decades, from one revolution (1789) to
another (1848). Unification of coinage was already an old story, but the great change
was the creation of the franc as the unit of account (1795) and of coins indicating their
nominal value, thus unifying account and payment. The Banque de France, created in
1800, was one of a couple of banks of issue established in Paris, the first one being
created in 1796. In 1803, Napoleon gave it the monopoly over banknote issue, but for
Paris only. The issuing privilege was rapidly extended to the whole country, but not the
monopoly, and, as the Banque de France concentrated his activity in Paris, neglecting
other regions of the country, a series of independent banks flourished that developed
their own issuing activity. They were created by merchants needing a financial operator
able to discount their bills of exchange. They established in a series of departments
(territorial units composing the state). Those banknotes of Banques de département
generally circulated only in a small area, barely beyond the original department. It was
only after the 1848 Revolution that the whole monopoly was given to the Banque de
France, and the Banques départementales became simple branch offices of the Banque
de France (Jacoud, 1996). Fifteen years later, this monopoly was contested a few years
following the integration of Savoie to the country, but the Banque de France managed
to recover it.
The banknote case allows some conclusions. At some extent, banknotes issues
from local banks may be considered as local currency issues, even if they were
processed inside a unified monetary system (as the contemporary United Kingdom’s
one). It seems clear that local banks of issues provided money to agents needing it
through discounting bills of exchange or other sorts of credit, whereas a central bank
could not do it. In a banknote system not unified or, at least, not hierarchized under a
central bank of issue, local banknote issues could be seen as an efficient way to finance
local needs. This was especially the case in France, where local banks of issues were
created in order to pass through the lack of branches of office of the Banque de France.
As far as local banknotes were not allowed to circulate in a larger space than
their original region, one can say, too, that providing local economies with such
currencies  stimulated  a  local  circulation.  One  can  say,  then,  that,  even  when
convertibility was full and at par with national money (which was the French case but
not the Scottish one), this system improved the situation of local economies because of
a space differentiation of monies.9
5. Local currencies aiming to change money
A last kind of local currencies is directly related with the purpose of this
Conference, since today’s local monetary experiments include a strong political purpose
aiming to change the very nature of money. In the past, a series of small experiments
occurred in some European countries, that provided lessons for activists — but barely
for theoreticians, probably because of their political background. Those experiments
occurred in the second and in the third historical period distinguished above, which
were periods of rising capitalism provoking a rising worker’s poverty, periods of severe
macroeconomic  depression  and  a  spatial  polarization  of  economic  activity  and
demography, meaning outflows of workers and purchasing power from remote places to
large towns. In this context, researches of ways to revitalize the economy and to change
the rules of the game flourished that sometimes led to local experiments. One can
distinguish  two  main  experiments  according  to  the  main  theoretical  originator:
experiments organized by Robert Owen and experiments inspired by Silvio Gesell’s
ideas.
However, an account of those experiments needs a first clarification given the
analytical framework of this paper. First, the analytical framework leads to make
relative the concept of “local”, because experiments may be organized on the principle
of a group of users and not of a given territory; transactions in the specific currency are
then “local” in the sense that they develop inside a restricted set of persons. Should this
set be anchored in a given territory could be a secondary matter – see today’s Michael
Linton’s Open Money project. Second, the analytical framework leads to make more
precise the nature of issuers. In most cases, the issuer is a civil organization aiming at
developing insider’s transactions. In one case (Wörgl), this was directly a local public
authority, since the leading person (Michael Unterguggenberger) tried to implement
theoretical ideas in his area of responsibility (he was the mayor of Wörgl). In other
cases, like French experiments of 1956-1960, it is not a town that implemented the
experiments but a group of citizens who bypassed the town’s legal authorities or who
tried something completely aside authorities. Third, the main rationale for issuing its
own local currency is mainly a transforming rationale, due to theoretical and political
backgrounds aiming at a radical transformation of the organisation of society. But the
economic and social context meant that this transforming rationale was completed by
purposes that were more urgent: protecting local spaces against a general shortage of
revenues (Gesellian) or against the submission to an economic system impoverishing
workers (Owen), and revitalizing them (Gesellian).10
5.1. Owen’s experiments
The action and the ideas of Robert Owen (1771-1858) are at the origin of the co-
operative movement, which was born in England in the second quarter of the 19
th
century1. Of Welsh origin, Owen quickly became a wealthy manufacturer, acquiring in
1797 the large cotton factory of New Lanark, where he set up an organization intended
to improve the working conditions and the human character. Later, it created co-
operative communities, including that, in 1824, of New Harmony, in Indiana (United
States). His only durable success however, and in a certain way diluted, was the British
co-operative movement. By his activism and his ideas, Owen is considered as the
founder of English socialism.
Robert  Owen  denunciated  the  conditions  of  the  working  class  and  built
proposals intended to promote a harmonious society respectful of humankind. He aimed
at  breaking  the  contradiction  between  an  extraordinary  increase  in  output  and
productivity and the massive impoverishment of workers, which led to overproduction
crises. One key problem relies in the workers’ remunerations. In an equitable society,
the whole value of labour should be repaid to workers; this should give conditions to
equalize output and consumption. This led Owen to make concrete proposals (Owen,
1821) and to start implementing them on a local level: at first, in Indiana (U.S.) in 1824;
then, in England with consumption and production cooperatives; and, finally, in 1832-
34, under the form of two “National Equitable Labour Exchanges” set up in London
and in Birmingham.
In those two places, a system of “labour notes” was set up as a local currency.
Independent workers deposited their products and were paid with labour notes, on the
basis of an average estimated time for producing them. These labour notes, not
convertible into pound sterling, were useable for purchasing other’s deposited goods.
The unit of account was the hour (there were notes of 1 hour, 2 hours, etc.), but behind
this unit remained the pound sterling, since a strict equivalence was fixed at six pence
an hour.
During the first months, the two experiments were successful and the number of
workers rose sharply, reaching 840 members. They deposited a great number of goods.
However, because of organizational problems, the system failed soon and had to stop in
1834. No similar organization was settled after that. The major problems leading to the
failure was the difference between the rhythm of deposits and the rhythm of purchases.
There was an average of 40 000 hours of goods deposited every week, but purchases
were only nearly one half of it. There were shortages of some goods while others staid
                                                
1 This section is built on the basis of Owen (1963), Denis (1907), Dupuis (1991, 1999). We presented
Owen’s ideas and monetary experiments in Blanc (1998a).11
deposited without being purchased because of their bad quality or their abundance.
Such gaps may be explained by two major reasons: first, diversity of goods was too
limited, due to the similarities between the independent workers who depositing goods;
second, some deposited bad goods in order to get goods saleable outside the system
against pound sterling. Workers were able to make comparisons with outside and
developed speculative behaviours and arbitrages. The organization itself was then
failing.
5. 2. Gesellian experiments
Silvio Gesell, a German merchant expatriated 11 years in Argentina, developed
his first economics ideas in relation with the Argentinean crisis of the 1890’s2. Back to
Europe at the end of this decade, he settled in Switzerland and wrote what became his
famous Natural Economic Order (Die natürliche Wirtschaftsordnung durch Freiland
und Freigeld, 1916). He claimed to be a Proudhonian socialist, aiming at a non-
capitalist market economy. He aimed at freeing money from interest and land from rent,
slowing  down  economic  activity  and  provoking  poverty  and  inequalities.  In  an
economic system cleared of every privilege previously concentrated by landowners and
money holders, workers would receive the whole value of their output; competition
between people could then develop on a fair basis and economy could flourish.
Concerning money, Gesell denunciated both the predominance of the store of value
function of money and the destructive role of interest rate. Both lead to give a privilege
to money holders against those who hold goods, which leads to slow down monetary
circulation  and,  thus,  economic  activity.  An  organization  favouring  monetary
circulation by discouraging the use of money as a store of wealth has to be set up. The
key point is an inversion of the interest logic: a holding cost has to be set up, that
stimulates the use of money holdings and then economic activity.
If they did not share the basis of his theoretical view on money, at least two
major economists recognized that Gesell’s practical idea on money was a good one:
John Maynard Keynes (1936), identifying in Gesell’s idea the good direction towards
an acceleration of monetary circulation, and Irving Fisher (1934), admitting the
Gesellian way to overcome deflation in the context of the Great depression and
proposing it as a global solution to the candidate Roosevelt (Allen, 1977; Barber, 1996).
However, the theoretical purpose of free money became a simple organization of the
acceleration of monetary circulation, i.e. accelerated money, losing the other dimensions
of Gesell’s socialist theory
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Silvio Gesell. I presented Gesell’s monetary ideas and later experiments in Blanc (1998b).12
Debates on Gesellian ideas occurred in the context of economic disorders in
Europe from the beginning of the First World War to the middle of the twenties, and in
the context of the depression of the thirties marked by a deflation process. Gesell’s
ideas were well discussed in Germany, France, Switzerland, Great Britain, Austria or
the United States, years before they were partially experimented in the thirties (Onken,
1997). Gesell’s proposals were not local ones, but the experiments established on the
basis of his ideas always were on a local level.
An engineer and friend of Gesell, Hans Timm, is the founder of the first
experiment of stamped money. It occurred in Germany in 1930. It was based on an
exchange bank and stamped notes called wära3. It took place in the little town of
Schwanenkirchen, where a coal mining had been closed. The re-opening of the mining
was permitted by its financing through the payment of wages in wära. Soon the
government argued that this system was hurting the issuing privilege of the Central
Bank and induced a risk of inflation. The government lost a trial, but banned by decree
the use of this sort of money in October 1931 (Delannès, 1938).
Yet, the most important experiment of accelerated money took place in Wörgl, a
little town of the Austrian Tyrol, in 1932-33 (von Muralt, 1934; Baudin, 1947;
Delannès, 1938; Onken, 1997). It is still considered today as the mother experiment of
all further one. Wörgl was an impoverished town of 2,000 inhabitants and counted, with
its neighbourhood, 1,500 unemployed persons. The town was in state of bankruptcy. In
July 1932, its mayor, Michael Unterguggenberger, set up a system of stamped notes
called « labour notes » from 1 to 10 schillings issued by the municipal office. Every
month, holders had to buy stamps of 1% of their nominal value in order to maintain it.
The issued notes were totally backed on a schilling reserve. The municipal office paid a
part of the salaries of the municipal employees and this stamped money circulated in the
town and the neighbourhood, people trusting their final reception by the municipal
office, which indeed received them in payment of taxes at par with the Austrian
schilling. Moreover, it secured the convertibility between the stamped notes and the
Austrian schilling, taking a 2% duty.
The currency sharply accelerated4. Some paid their taxes in advance to avoid
buying stamps. The financial situation of the municipality and the local economy
recovered.  The  municipality  hired  workers  and  implemented  public  works.  The
principle of savings was safe with a system of deposits in the Office where the
depreciation stopped. Finally, in spite of its apparent succeeding in economic recovery5
                                                
3 Wära means Ware (commodity) and Währung (circulation).
4 According to Kennedy (1996), the 32 000 schillings issued were exchanged 463 times - generally 21
times with the Austrian schilling.
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but above all because of the will of many towns to set up such systems6, the Austrian
government, on a claim of the National Bank of Austria, banned the principle of local
stamped money in September 1933 (von Muralt, 1934; Unterguggenberger, 1934).
There were some others experiments – including the United States’ ones (see in
this conference the presentation of Loren Gatch). In France, some men as Jean Barral,
Pierre Mouton and Marino-Bertil Issautier militated in favour of stamped money
systems. An experiment occurred two years in Nice in the thirties, but the government,
on the claim of the Banque de France, banned it soon. After the Second World War,
two little french towns set up stamped money and finally the founders decided to stop
before the government banned it: Lignières-en-Berry and Marens (1956-1960). Those
three French cases developed on a small scale and with some difficulties. They were
organized by groups of local merchants whose political ideas rejected the State as an
agent of taxation. Local currencies were issued by an association that served as bank of
issue (Onken, 1997; Laacher, 2003).
All those experiments raise questions on the viability of local schemes built in a
hostile  context.  Some  key  points  may  be  listed  here.  First,  an  agreement  with
institutions  of  the  environment  (of  course,  law  on  money;  tax  authority;  local
governments…) is an absolute necessity in order to be viable. Second, incentives have
to be set up in order to stimulate the will of the people to use the local currency rather
than the national one. This necessity is as high as local currency is submitted to a
voluntary depreciation, like Gesellian experiments, and as local currency is placed aside
national currency by preventing conversions between them, like Owen’s ones.
6. Conclusion
In order to conclude, we try to stress differences between local currencies in
European history and those that have been rising since the 1970s. European history
gives evidences that the contemporary dynamics of local currencies is not a new one.
However, it shows differences between past and present: the contemporary dynamics
appears to be a specific one.
Issuers, rationales and necessities are different. Contemporary experiences of
local currencies mainly come from civil associations and are sometimes (but too rarely)
related with local banks, whereas past local currencies were much more created by local
public authorities and banks in their normal activity. Moreover, today’s experiences are
                                                                                                                                  
as a singularity, one can stress with Baudin (1947, p. 338) or von Muralt (1934) that the recovery was
partly due to the flow of tourists coming in these strange town to see and buy the stamped money.
6 It seems that 170 Austrian towns (including Innsbrück) envisaged setting up such a system, but they
were waiting for the current legal action against Wörgl.14
disconnected with the sovereignty motive and often far from a seigniorage or direct
financing motive. Moreover, they rely more than never upon a transforming and a
revitalizing motive. Past experiences mainly occurred during great economic disorder
leading to put first a protecting motive. Overall, the transforming rationale was very
rare and limited in the past. European history shows many local currencies issued from
situations of macroeconomic necessity, by public authorities, firms or banks, or even
civil associations. This is a major difference with today’s local currencies spreading in
developed countries, where the necessity is less a macroeconomic one and more a
matter of human development and social cohesion and protection.
Moreover, there was never a transnational connexion between activists and
experiments at today’s extent, nor was there a transnational reflection as the one that
appears progressively since two decades. This is a direct effect of globalization through
cheaper transport and internet. Finally, there was never a serious expertise on local
monetary problems, except from the local currencies that were considered “serious” like
local banknotes. This is no more the case, since three decades of diverse forms of local
currencies led to raise interest of academics and to develop more and more field
expertise in this domain.
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